Do our elected representatives really represent us?

Do our elected representatives really “represent” us?

Truth about democracy: MPs claim to speak on our behalf but more than 98 percent of them have backing of less than half of the registered votes. In the current‘first-past-the-post’ system, caste and religion can sway the result. The law commission and election

commission have suggested an alternative, which needs to be debated

Jagdeep S. Chhokar[i]

GovernanceNow, July 16-31, 2011, pp.2-23

One of the major arguments used by the opponents of the Lokpal in the recent furore has been to assert the legitimacy of our elected representatives. The argument goes that only the elected representatives have the right to make laws, and the “unelected” and “unelectable” have no right or say in the matter. This raises the question of how representative are our “elected” representatives. Let us look at a simplified example.

For the sake of ease of calculation, let us assume a constituency has 100 registered voters. “Registered” is important because even though the total population of the constituency, including all age groups, might be 500, and people above 18 years (the minimum age of voting) might be 200, but all 200 may not be “registered” voters unless they get themselves registered and are part of the electoral roll. The assumption here is that only 100 have got themselves registered as voters.

The voting percentage in most elections in the country is around 50-60 %. The recent assembly elections in five states recorded voting percentages in the range of 70-80% and one hopes this continues but the overall trend so far has been in the 50-60% range. So, let us assume the voting percentage in our hypothetical constituency of 100 registered voters to be 60%. The argument will hold even if we take the voting percentage to be 80 but we will stay with 60% for now, for the sake of computational simplicity. This means that 60 people vote in the election, or 60 votes are cast.

One more assumption, let there be only six (6) candidates. Assuming that all candidates are equally good, and voters vote accordingly, on average, each candidate would get ten (10) votes. Any one who gets 11 will be declared elected under the current variant of the “First-past-the-post” (FPTP) system that we have chosen to follow.

Admittedly, it is a theoretical example because of small and easily computable numbers, but it applies equally well to larger numbers. What does this say about the “representative-ness” of the representative who has been “elected”?

Ignoring the total population of 500 and confining the analysis to the registered voters numbering 100, for the time being and again for the sake of simplicity of calculation, out of the 60 people who voted (or out of 60 votes cast), 11 voted for the winner. This works out to 18.33 per cent. If we were to take all the “registered” votes in place of the votes cast, the percentage works out to 11. We, thus, have an “elected representative” whom 11 % or 18.33 % voters voted in favour of. Taking the flip side, it is equally true that 100-11=89 percent of the voters did not vote for the winner. What is more startling is that 60-11=49 or 81.67% {(49/60)/100} or (100-18.33) voted against him. To put it in words, 89% of the “registered” voters did not vote for the winner, and 81.67% of the “votes cast” were cast against the winner!!

There are two questions for the reader at this stage: (a) Is the above a figment of the distorted imagination of a retired professor or a rabid activist? And (b) What might the minimum level of voting percentage cast in her/his favour that will make an elected representative, truly “representative”?

Assuming the answer to (b) to be 50 per cent, let us look at hard data from the 2009 Lok Sabha election. Out of 543 MPs elected, 77.9 % were elected with less than 50% of the votes cast, and 98.09% were elected with less than 50% of the registered votes. The break-up of percentages at different levels of percentiles is given in the accompanying table.

% CATEGORIES OF VOTES	Number of winners under each category (based on % of votes cast)	% of winners from each category based on votes cast	Number of winners under each category (based on % of registered votes)	% of winners from each category based on registered votes
0 to 9.99	0	0.00%	2	0.37%
10 to 19.99	0	0.00%	143	26.34%
20 to 29.99	29	5.34%	212	39.04%
30 to 39.99	138	25.41%	148	27.26%
40 to 49.99	256	47.15%	33	6.08%
50 to 59.99	106	19.52%	4	0.74%
60 to 69.99	11	2.03%	1	0.18%
70 to 79.99	3	0.55%	0	0.00%
Total	543	100.00%	543	100.00%

Can anything be done to improve the “representative-ness” short of major changes such as moving from the “First-past-the-post” system to the “Proportional Representation” system that has been recommended from time to time?

The Law Commission of India proposed what it called “An alterative method of election” in its 170^th report titled “Reform of the Electoral Law” submitted in 1999. Devoting a full part (Part VIII) of their report to this issue, the Law Commission said, “This method goes a long way in ensuring purity of elections, keeping out criminals and other undesirable elements and also serves to minimise the role and importance of caste and religion.” The Law Commission described the alternative method in the following terms:

“(a) no candidate should be declared elected unless he obtains at least 50% of the votes cast;

(b) the ballot paper shall contain a column at the end which can be marked by a voter who is not inclined to vote for any of the candidates on the ballot paper, which is called hereinafter as `negative vote'. (A voter can cast a negative vote only when he is not inclined to vote for any of the candidates on the ballot paper);

(c) for the purposes of calculating the fifty per cent votes of the votes cast, even the negative votes will be treated as `votes cast';

(d) if no person gets 50% or more votes, then there should be a `run-off' election between the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes;

(e) in the run-off election too, there should be a provision for a negative vote and even here there should be a requirement that only that candidate will be declared elected who receives 50% or more of the `votes cast' as explained hereinabove;

(f) if no candidate gets 50% or more of the votes cast in the run-off, there should be a fresh election from that constituency" (Para 8.1).

Explaining the rationale of the method, the Law Commission said, “This method of election is designed to achieve two important objectives viz., (i) to cut down or, at any rate, to curtail the significance and role played by caste factor in the electoral process. There is hardly any constituency in the country where anyone particular caste can command more than 50% of the votes. This means that a candidate has to carry with him several castes and communities, to succeed; (ii) the negative vote is intended to put moral pressure on political parties not to put forward candidates with undesirable record i.e., criminals, corrupt elements and persons with unsavory background” (Para 8.2).

Recognising ground realities and making a balanced assessment, the Law Commission continued, “No doubt this method calls for a run-off and a fresh election in case no candidate obtains 50% or more votes even in the run-off, and in that sense expensive and elaborate, yet it has the merit of compelling the political parties to put forward only good candidates and to eschew bad characters and corrupt elements” (Para 8.2.1).

Not being oblivious of the issues arising out of the implementation of this “alternative method of election”, the Law Commission observed, “If the above practical difficulties and problems can be overcome, the idea of 50%+1 vote -- and even the idea of negative vote (as explained hereinabove), can be implemented. We may mention that if electronic voting machines are introduced throughout the country, it will become a little more easier to hold a run-off election inasmuch as it would then be not necessary to print fresh ballot papers showing the names of the two candidates competing in the run-off -- or for that matter, for holding a fresh election (in case the idea of negative vote is also given effect to)” (Emphasis added) (Para 8.7).

It does not need to be pointed out that the condition precedent mentioned by the Law Commission, of usage of electronic voting machines “throughout the country”, has already been satisfied and therefore there is really no major obstacle to the adoption of this suggestion, particularly in view of the Law Commission’s observation in the very next paragraph, “Alternative method mitigates undesirable practices. - Probably, the aforesaid problems arise because of the vastness of the country and lack of requisite standards of behaviour and also of cooperation and understanding among the political parties to ensure a peaceful poll…. This is really unfortunate. Even so, we may make every effort to mitigate the undesirable practices and the alternate method of election set out in this chapter is certainly a step in that direction” (Emphasis added) (Para 8.8).

The observations about “lack of requisite standards of behaviour and also of cooperation and understanding among political parties” need to be noted.

Some observations of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) are very pertinent to this issue. In Para 4.5 of its 2001 report, the NCRWC said, “With the electorate having no role in the selection of candidates and with majority of candidates being elected by minority of votes under the first-past-the-post system, the representative character of the representatives itself becomes doubtful and their representational legitimacy is seriously eroded. In many cases, more votes are cast against the winning candidates than for them. One of the significant probable causes may be the mismatch between the majoritarian or first-past-the-post system and the multiplicity of parties and large number of independents” (Emphasis added).

The NCRWC, in 2001, did note the benefits of this system but was somewhat circumspect, saying, “In the circumstances, the Commission while recognizing the beneficial potential of this system for a more representative democracy, recommends that the Government and the Election Commission of India should examine this issue of prescribing a minimum of 50% plus one vote for election in all its aspects, consult various political parties, and other interests that might consider themselves affected by this change and evaluate the acceptability and benefits of this system. The Commission recommends a careful and full examination of this issue by the Government and the Election Commission of India” (Emphasis added) (Para 4.16.6).

The Election Commission first suggested a “None of the above” option in 2001 and revisited it in 2004 as part of its Proposed Electoral Reforms. This is what the Election Commission said in 2004: “In the voting using the conventional ballot paper and ballot boxes, an elector can drop the ballot paper without marking his vote against any of the candidates, if he chooses so. However, in the voting using the Electronic Voting Machines, such a facility is not available to the voter. Although, Rule 49-O of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 provides that an elector may refuse to vote after he has been identified and necessary entries made in the Register of Electors and the marked copy of the electoral roll, the secrecy of voting is not protected here inasmuch as the polling officials and the polling agents in the polling station get to know about the decision of such a voter.

The Commission recommends that the law should be amended to specifically provide for negative / neutral voting. For this purpose, Rules 22 and 49B of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 may be suitably amended adding a proviso that in the ballot paper and the particulars on the ballot unit, in the column relating to names of candidates, after the entry relating to the last candidate, there shall be a column “None of the above”, to enable a voter to reject all the candidates, if he chooses so. Such a proposal was earlier made by the Commission in 2001 (vide letter dated 10.12.2001)” (Emphasis added).

While pointing out the limitations of Rule 49-O, the 2004 observations of the Election Commission overlooked the fact that votes deemed to have been cast under Rule 49-O are not counted, and therefore have no impact on the outcome of the election.

It should be clear from the above that:

• The “representational legitimacy” or “representative-ness” of the representatives elected under the current system is in serious doubt.
• It is possible to improve the existing system without completely giving up the current First-Past-the-Post system, and going whole hog to the proportional representation system.
• Some of the changes that need to be made are:

• EVMs should have an option or a button for “None-of-the-above”.

• Votes cast for the “None-of-the-above” option should also be counted.

• In case the “None-of-the-above” option gets more votes than any of the candidates, none of the candidates should be declared elected and a fresh election held in which none of the candidates in this election are allowed to contest.

• In the following elections, with fresh candidates and with a “None-of-the-above” option, only that candidate should be declared elected who gets at least 50%+1 of the votes cast.

• IF even in this round, the “None-of-the-above” option gets the highest number of votes cast or none of the candidate gets at least 50%+1 of the votes cast, then the process should be repeated.

This may appear to be a cumbersome and tedious process but it will nudge the entire system in the direction of (a) better representative-ness among the elected representatives by reducing the sectarian effects of vote banks, and (b) encouraging political parties to put up better candidates.

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[i] Chhokar is a former professor, dean, and director in-charge of Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, and a founding member of Association for Democratic Reforms (www.adrindia.org) and National Election Watch (NEW).

Lokpal needs teeth to bite

The Tribune, July 02, 2011

OPED GOVERNANCE

That there will be a consensus on Lokpal is not in doubt. The real issue is what kind of Lokpal will get a consensus — perhaps not the one that might have the potential to make a real difference to the functioning of the establishment

LOKPAL NEEDS TEETH TO BITE

Jagdeep S. Chhokar

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110702/edit.htm#6

THE empire strikes back", 'Divide and rule' triumphs". These could well be the headlines towards the end of British rule in the subcontinent. Interestingly, substituting "empire" with "establishment" could make it a headline appropriate for the situation today. Having succeeded in first propping up Baba Ramdev, thus dividing what was labelled as a "civil society", then discrediting him and now in hyphenating Ramdev and Anna Hazare, the glee in the "establishment" is hard to miss.

Who or what is this "establishment"? In most discussions on the issue, it is often referred to as "the government". Even an editorial in The Tribune on June 14 ends on a pious note, saying "The country must be tired of the daily discourse on corruption and probity in public life. It is time to act and the government will do well to forge a consensus among all political parties on how to combat corruption before Parliament's monsoon session begins."

Lifting the veil

Using the corporate law provision of "lifting the corporate veil" in which the persons actually behind the artificially created corporations are identified in exceptional situations, it is time the nation looked behind the corporate veil of the government: where does the government come from? It comes from Parliament because members of the political executive come from amongst the members of Parliament.

Continuing with the lifting of the veil, where do the MPs come from? Yes, in theory, "We, the People" elect them but before "we" can vote for or against the candidates contesting elections, who decides who can be candidates? Yes, in theory again, anyone can be a candidate but in practice, one needs the nomination of a political party to become a candidate with a realistic chance of being elected. So, behind "the government", there are political parties.

So, does "the establishment" consist only of political parties? Not really. Only one section of society, however powerful, cannot hold society to ransom, to use a strong expression. "The establishment" actually consists of the political parties in collaboration (collusion will again be a strong expression) with the bureaucracy and big business.

The glee, therefore, is not confined to the government; it extends to all political parties, the bureaucracy and business. This is what the Jan Lokpal Bill is up against. Yes, a Lokpal Bill will be introduced in the monsoon session of the Lok Sabha, and it might even be passed, even unanimously, with "consensus among all political parties", as the editorial on June 14 advised. But what is that likely to be? Let us look at some examples of issues on which there has been a consensus among political parties in the past.

Instances of increasing the MPLAD Fund amount and the salary for MPs are too obvious and well known to be mentioned. So let us stick to three instances arising out of personal experience.
The first was in 2002 when the Supreme Court ordered a mandatory disclosure of criminal, financial and educational antecedents of the candidates contesting elections to Parliament and state assemblies, and the Election Commission issued orders to implement the Supreme Court's decision.

It was decided at an all-party meeting on July 8, 2002, that this would not be allowed and the Representation of the People Act will be amended in that very session of Parliament. The amending Bill was ready by July 15, in seven days flat, but could not be introduced as Parliament was adjourned due to the petrol pump scam when Ram Naik was the Petroleum Minister. The government was not deterred.

The Cabinet decided to issue an Ordinance. When the newly elected President, Abdul Kalam, "returned" the Ordinance without signing, it was sent to him again, and he had to sign. The Ordinance was finally declared "unconstitutional…null and void" by the Supreme Court on March 13, 2003.

The second instance was in 2007-08 when the Income Tax Department refused to provide copies of income tax returns of political parties in response to an application under the Right to Information Act because political parties objected to it. The objections were despite the fact that political parties were claiming, and getting, 100 per cent exemption from income tax under a law that Parliament had enacted.

In the hearing of an appeal to the Central Information Commission (CIC), ten lawyers showed up to represent various political parties, including some who had flown in from outside Delhi, to oppose the disclosure. Fortunately, the CIC decided that copies of IT returns had to be given.

The third, and the latest, started in 2009, and culminated on June 03 this year. The Committee on Ethics of the Rajya Sabha instituted a "Register of Interests" of members, in which the financial, business and other commercial interests of members were to be recorded. The stated purpose of the register was to avoid potential conflicts of interest while members of the Rajya Sabha participated in debates in the House and in the formation of standing committees on various issues.

When copies of the register of interests were requested under the RTI Act, these were refused. The response of the Appellate Authority in the Rajya Sabha Secretariat, received on November 23, 2009, to the first appeal was that "the Committee on Ethics, Rajya Sabha,…taking a unanimous view claimed exemption from furnishing the desired information…the decision not to allow the information asked for is that of the Committee on Ethics, Rajya Sabha, which has the endorsement of the Chairman of the Committee" (italics added). Once again, the CIC, on second appeal, decided on June 03, 2011, that the information should be provided.

Politics of consensus

These three instances prove, beyond doubt, that our political parties have no problem in arriving at a consensus and acting unanimously provided (and this is critical) the issue is of their interest. And obviously, these are not the only instances. Consensus and unanimity are also visible when 17 Bills are passed in eleven minutes. What that shows about the application of mind and the quality of scrutiny and discussion is a separate issue.

That there will be a consensus on a Lokpal Bill is not in doubt. The real issue is what kind of a Lokpal will get a consensus: one like a plethora of existing institutions that have acquiesced in corruption becoming rampant at the behest of the establishment, or the one that might have the potential to make a real difference to the functioning of the establishment, and an "effective" Lokpal with teeth that can actually bite.

The writer is a former Professor, Dean and Director of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.
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There is conflict of interest

Now that there are two Lokpal Bills -- the Jan Lokpal Bill (JLB) and the Government Lokpal Bill (GLB) -- what is likely to happen? Political predictions obviously are always unreliable and also hazardous, but one plausible scenario is the following. Both the Bills will be presented to the Cabinet. The Cabinet has members of parties other than the Congress too. Depending on the clout of the non-Congress Cabinet members (which is not overwhelming, if it is there at all), there might be some changes in the GLB.

The Cabinet will decide which one of the Bills, or both of them, should be put first to the all-party meeting, and then to Parliament. All-party meetings, particularly on crucial national issues, usually do not produce a consensus as we saw again on the women's reservation issue, and it seems unlikely that the opposition parties will like to allow the UPA to get credit for introducing a credible Lokpal.

A big risk unlikely

That will leave it to the UPA to decide what to put before Parliament. Given the complexity as well as delicacy of the current socio-political situation, and going by its past record, the UPA is unlikely to take a big risk by taking a definitive stand.

Even if the above scenario is unlikely, let us for the moment assume that the two Bills, the JLB and the GLB, are put to vote in Parliament. Which way is the vote in Parliament likely to go?
Before the above question can be answered, let us continue with the "lifting of the veil". What is Parliament? It is comprised of its members. But who are its members?

With due respect to Parliament as the highest democratic institution in the country, some bitter facts stare us in the face. On the basis of data taken from sworn affidavits submitted by members of Parliament as part of their nomination papers while contesting elections, 162 out of 543 members of the current Lok Sabha (2009) have criminal cases pending against them in which charges have been framed by the court of law and the punishment for which is two or more years of imprisonment. This number, based on the same source, was 156 in the earlier Lok Sabha (2004).

The same source shows that there are 315 crorepatis in the current Lok Sabha (2009), whereas this number was 128 in the earlier Lok Sabha (2004). While estimates differ depending on which economist one consults, the proportion of people who are below the poverty line (which is around Rs.12 per day) is said to be between 37.2 and 77 per cent. If we combine it with the fact that almost two-third of the members of the current Lok Sabha (2009) have been elected with more votes cast against them than for them, reasonable, if not serious, doubts arise about the representational legitimacy of such members.

Given the above characteristics, how does one expect the vote in Parliament to go? Expecting parliamentarians to vote against their personal and party interests, in the so-called national interest, seems highly over-optimistic and idealistic. We do not live in an ideal world; we live in a practical and real world. And this is what creates a national conflict of interest.

Two options

Is there a way out? There has to be, else we, as a nation, would be doomed to sink deeper and deeper into the morass created by the all-pervasive corruption, large and small. There seem to be only two options. One is an opportunity for the elected representatives, however questionable their representative legitimacy be, to regain lost ground and establish their legitimacy by giving primacy to the national interest by voting in a strong and effective Lokpal Bill, even independent of and combining the best of both, the JLB and the GLB.

If that does not happen, then possibly the Rubicon would have been crossed. There may then be no alternative but to ascertain the opinion of "We, the People" by way of a referendum for which we do not have a provision…yet. But then, don't extraordinary situations require extraordinary responses?

— Jagdeep S. Chhokar

====================

Conflict conundrum

The Hindustan Times

Conflict conundrum

Jagdeep S Chhokar
June 24, 2011

'Consultant', like 'professional', is an often used - and abused - word. Having functioned as a consultant in the area of organisation and management, I am conscious of the dilemma a consultant of the old school faces: should I make the client self-reliant thus working myself out of a job? Or should I do just enough to ensure a steady income? This is a classic conflict of interest situation. But does it work at the national level?

The society and polity in India are at crossroads today. Corruption has permeated the innards of society and the value system. Almost no one in the country seems unaffected by it. Penetration of such phenomena to this extent doesn't happen without acquiescence and active abetment by significant portions of society. Who has been responsible for it in India is less relevant than what - if anything - can be done about it. That brings us to the national conflict of interest.

Two recent phenomena illustrate this. The first is the current flavour of the month, the lokpal; the second is a perennial favourite, State funding of elections. Under our Constitution, both these need to be voted on in Parliament.

Holding the Parliament in the highest possible esteem and with no intention to compromise its dignity as the highest democratic institution in the country, one has to admit that its performance, or of the honourable members who comprise it, has not really covered it in glory of late. Without casting any aspersion on the institution as a whole, one can't wish away the fact that almost 30% (162 of 543) members have criminal cases pending against them in which charges have been framed by the court of law and the punishment for which is two or more years of imprisonment. This number has increased from 156 in the 2004 Lok Sabha.

With the number of crorepatis in the Lok Sabha having increased from 128 to 315 from 2004 to 2009, when almost half of India's population lives on s Rs 20 or less per day, and with almost 78% members of the 2009 Lok Sabha having had more votes cast against them than for them, what can be said about the 'representativeness' of the elected representatives? But what does this have to do with the conflict of interest?

Lots actually. It is these honourable members who will vote on whether there should be a lokpal or not, and if there should be one, what its powers should be. How would anyone vote if the choice is between (a) ensuring that one's party continues to function in a way so that the chances of it remaining in power or acquiring power are maximised, and (b) taking a leap into the unknown where one doesn't know what might happen? And can the honourable members be blamed for voting to ensure their, their progeny's, and their party's future well-being? The nation's well-being is not considered to be an issue these days. This is the conflict of interest the current political and electoral system creates.

Now to the perennial favourite: State funding of elections. This paper reported on June 20 that in a draft Cabinet note, the law ministry has proposed State funding for women and schedules castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) candidates.

The saga of State funding is similar to the lokpal but in the opposite direction. While the political establishment has successfully thwarted the lokpal for 42 years, it has been chasing State funding of elections for 38 years since 1972. Despite all kinds of recommendations, the spectre of financial transparency as a prerequisite somehow gets raised and enthusiasm for State funding wanes. The Cabinet note this time has taken two precautions. Following the 'thin end of the wedge' principle, it proposes State funding only for women and SC/ST candidates, and makes it part of a 'package' deal, the other part being barring candidates with criminal cases pending against them.

How would anyone vote if there were a prospect of getting free money to contest elections now, or later, once the system becomes acceptable in the public eye with women and SC/ST candidates? It is obvious that our elected representatives face severe conflicts of interest.

Is there a way out? How do we deal with such national conflicts of interests? Can we deal with them, short of expecting our elected representatives to be utter paragons of virtue, completely devoid of self-interest? Two ways seem possible.

Gopalkrishna Gandhi suggested the first on this page (A spectacular story, Incidentally, June 18) - a meeting held at Sevagram in March 1948 "between those who had entered public life through the portal of elections and those who were doing 'constructive work'." He concluded with two questions: "Is it impossible for a Sevagram 1948-type meeting to be convened by the equivalents of those who organised that meeting to discuss corruption? Is it inconceivable that they can be inspired to gather for a meeting chaired by the Congress president, inaugurated by the PM and addressed by representatives of the 'unelected' to discuss corruption?"

Sadly, saying an unqualified 'no' to these questions seems unrealistic. Other questions arise. Should such a meeting be chaired by the president of only one party? All the parties in power? At the Centre or in the states? Should this meeting be preceded by an all-party meeting? The past record of all-party meetings on issues of national interest is not very encouraging. There are no easy answers. But then, we should not expect easy answers to highly complex questions.

If the existing dispensation is unable to answer the questions adequately, do we go beyond the existing dispensation? That is what leads us to the other option. Should we - can we - seek the opinion of 'We, the People', going beyond, not above, our elected representatives? The dreaded word is 'referendum', which our Constitution does not provide for, so far. This, then, is the national dilemma. And the conflict of interest.

Jagdeep S Chhokar is former Dean, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.

The views expressed by the author are personal.

State should not fund elections

Jagdeep S Chhokar GovernanceNow | June 1-15, 2011

We are living in interesting times. “Increasing cost of elections” is a problem for

everyone except those who incur that expenditure (the candidates and their sponsoring

political parties), as GovernanceNow reported in the last issue;

and “state funding of elections” is a solution that no one seems to want except

the candidates and their sponsoring political parties! The urge for state

funding seems to be so strong that no less than the law minister wrote an

article in one of the leading English dailies a couple of months ago

making a case for it.

As is usual in such attempts, the justification for state funding of elections began

with references to the Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and the Indrajit Gupta

Committee (1998), with both reported to have recommended providing state funding

to candidates of recognised political parties. A paragraph of the Indrajit

Gupta Committee report that politicians love to quote says, “The committee

see full justification constitutional, legal as well as on ground of public interest,

for grant of state subvention to political parties, so as to establish such conditions

where even the parties with modest financial resources may be able to compete

with those who have superior financial resources.” This rightly gives the

impression of the well-endowed political parties being in sympathy with their

less endowed brethren.

What our friends seem to overlook with unfailing regularity is the opening paragraph

of the “conclusion” of the same report that says, “Before concluding, the

committee cannot help expressing its considered view that its recommendations

being limited in nature and confined to only one of the aspects of the electoral

reforms may bring about only some cosmetic changes in the electoral sphere.

What is needed, however, is an immediate overhauling of the electoral process

whereby elections are freed from evil influence of all vitiating factors, particularly,

criminalisation of politics. It goes without saying that money power and

muscle power go together to vitiate the electoral process and it is their combined

effect which is sullying the purity of electoral contests and effecting free and fair

elections. Meaningful electoral reforms in other spheres of electoral activity are

also urgently needed” (emphasis added).

A more succinct description of what needs to be done is difficult to find which

should not be surprising since in addition to being chaired by the redoubtable

Indrajit Gupta, the committee had members such as Somnath Chatterjee and

Manmohan Singh.

But the report has not found favour with the larger political establishment

except for being quoted selectively.

  Around the same time that the Indrajit Gupta Committee was deliberating, the

Law Commission of India had suo motu undertaken a thorough review of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951. The stated “underlying objective was to

make the electoral process more fair, transparent and equitable. The effort

was also to reduce the several distortions and evils that had crept into the Indian

electoral system, to identify the areas where the legal provisions required

strengthening and improvement and to suggest the requisite measures in that

behalf”. The result of this review was the 170th report of the Law Commission

of India titled “Reform of the Electoral Laws” which is the most comprehensive

document on the subject in the country. It was submitted to the then law minister

in June 1999.

One full part (Part IV) of the 208-page people politics policy performance

report is devoted to “Control of Election Expenses” which contains an 11-page

chapter on “State Funding”. The entire chapter should be read to get a proper

understanding of the complexity of state funding. The concluding paragraph

(4.3.4) is reproduced below.

“Conclusions – After considering views expressed by the participants in the seminars

and by various persons and organisations in their responses and after perusing

relevant literature on the subject, the Law Commission is of the opinion

that in the present circumstances only partial state funding could be contemplated

more as a first step towards total state funding but it is absolutely essential

that before the idea of state funding (whether partial or total) is resorted to,

the provisions suggested in this report relating to political parties (including the

provisions ensuring internal democracy, internal structures) and maintenance of

accounts, their auditing and submission to Election Commission are implemented.

In other words, the implementation of the provisions recommended in Chapter

one Part three should be pre-condition to the implementation of the provisions

relating to partial state funding set out in the working paper in the Law Commission

(partial funding, as already stated, has also been recommended by the Indrajit Gupta

Committee). If without such pre-conditions, state funding, even if partial is resorted to,

it would not serve the purpose underlying the idea of state funding. The idea of state

funding is to eliminate the influence of money power and also to eliminate corporate funding,

black money support and raising of funds in the name of elections by the parties

and their leaders. The state funding, without the aforesaid pre-conditions, would merely

become another source of funds for the political parties and candidates at the cost

of public exchequer. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the proposals relating

to state funding contained in the Indrajit Gupta Committee Report should be implemented

only after or simultaneously with the implementation of the provisions contained

in this Report relating to political parties, viz., deletion of Explanation 1 to section 77,

maintenance of accounts and their submission etc. and the provisions governing the

functioning of political parties contained in chapters I and II of Part IV and Chapter I

of Part III. The state funding, even if partial, should never be resorted to unless the other

provisions mentioned aforesaid are implemented lest the very idea may prove counter-productive

and may defeat the every object underlying the idea of state funding of elections.”

(emphasis added).

Sadly, these recommendations of the Law Commission have not been heeded and demand for

state funding continues to be raised from time to time with absolutely no mention of or

regard to the “pre-conditions” specified as necessary.

The Law Commission is not the only one to lay down “pre-conditions”. The National

Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2001, said effectively the same

thing albeit using different terminology. It said, “Any system of state funding of elections

bears a close nexus to the regulation of working of political parties by law and to the

creation of a foolproof mechanism under law with a view to implementing the financial limits

strictly. Therefore, proposal for state funding should be deferred till these

regulator mechanisms are firmly in position” (emphasis added) (Para 4.14.5).

It is sometimes claimed that the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) has

recommended state funding. The “recommendation” of the ARC, in para 2.1.3.1.6 of its

fourth report, “Ethics in Governance” (2007), says, “a system for partial state funding

should be introduced to reduce the scope of illegitimate and unnecessary funding of

expenditure for elections.” Once again, this paragraph is quoted in isolation. Reading

the preceding paragraph (2.1.3.1.5) is instructive. It says, “In order to eradicate

the major source of political corruption, there is a compelling case for state

funding of elections. As recommended by the Indrajit Gupta Committee on State

Funding of Elections, the funding should be partial state funding mainly in kind

for certain essential items.” It is clear that the “recommendation” of the ARC

is within the ambit of the Indrajit Gupta committee report, and has to be read in

the context of the opening paragraph of the “conclusion” of the Indrajit Gupta

Committee report mentioned above.

The view of the Election Commission of India is clear from the interview of the

chief election commissioner in the last issue of GovernanceNow.

Despite all that is mentioned above that includes views and recommendations of government

and political committees, it is nothing short of amazing that the demand for state funding

of elections keeps coming up with startling regularity. That state funding is no solution

to any problem has been clear for a long time, and as the chief election commissioner has

said in the last issue, it “will not stop illegal expenses. In fact, more money will be

available to the candidates” and is, therefore, “dangerous”.

Let us, therefore, hope that we will not rush into the biggest scam by throwing thousands

of crores of good public money after bad money under the garb of state funding. 

Chhokar, a former dean of IIM, Ahmedabad, is a founder of Association for Democratic Reforms and National Election Watch.